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ing long-term policy strategy and not just in terms
of the pressures of the day. I have not followed
the ECB in fine detail, but to me the Bank has
done an excellent job in establishing policies that
will only be fully understood and appreciated in
the future.
Creation of the euro has already had a major
impact in unifying the capital markets of the mem-
ber countries. Interest rate spreads have narrowed
dramatically now that exchange-rate risk has been
eliminated. I’ve looked at a number of charts
showing spreads for government bonds issued
by various euro countries and it is striking how
spreads against German government bonds have
narrowed with the introduction of the euro.
Spreads within the euro area now reflect dif-
ferences in default risk and in market liquidity.
As a consequence, capital flows within the euro
area reflect fundamental investment considera-
tions rather than speculation on exchange rates
and policies that might interfere with the free
flow of capital. Capital flowing in response to
economic fundamentals will surely create a more
efficient use of available capital, which is always
a scarce resource.
I believe that creation of the euro will also
lead to a more efficient pattern of trade in goods
within Europe. Investment and production deci-
sions will depend now on comparative advantage
to a greater degree than before. Without the uncer-
tainty over exchange rates, firms can proceed
with greater confidence that their decisions will
not be upended by protectionist actions motivated
by efforts to influence exchange rates or to offset
the competitive effects of exchange rate changes.
I
am delighted to be here at this conference,
and especially delighted to be able to par-
ticipate in this session. Before proceeding,
though, I want to emphasize that the views
I express are mine and do not necessarily reflect
official positions of the Federal Reserve System.
I retain full responsibility for any errors in what
I am about to say.
The first thing to emphasize about the euro is
that creation of this new currency and new central
bank is a remarkable political, operational, and
monetary policy achievement. When I came to
the St. Louis Fed three years ago, I joined a well-
established organization with a long history. Given
my personal experience and all I had to learn, I
find it mind-boggling to think about the challenge
of establishing a new central bank from ground
zero. There was a certain amount of anguish last
year as the euro depreciated against the dollar,
but that happens from time to time to the very
best currencies in the world. The dollar, of course,
has seen its ups and downs over the years. That
the euro was beset by nothing more serious than
a perfectly normal period of weakness is evidence
of just how remarkable the achievement has been.
It is obvious, but nevertheless worth repeating,
that building the institutions and practices of the
European Central Bank will take time. The way
in which the ECB handles the problems and even
crises that will inevitably arise will shape future
events. I am sure that the leadership of the ECB
understands the precedent value of everything
that is done. But observers may not always under-
stand this point, and it is worth emphasizing in
the strongest possible terms that every action by
the ECB needs to be viewed as part of a develop-I have long been an advocate of floating
exchange rates, a position that initially reflected
the fact that I did my graduate work at the
University of Chicago under Milton Friedman.
What I have come to understand over the years—
and this view was always an important part of
Friedman’s thinking on currency issues—is that
the currency arrangement that works best is the
one that permits and encourages free and open
trade in goods and capital. As its economic inte-
gration increased, Europe found that freely float-
ing exchange rates too often created sharp changes
in competitive conditions, which made it difficult
to maintain the momentum toward increased
trade and capital openness within Europe. Fixing
rates to a degree through snakes and tunnels did
not work well either, as evidenced by exchange
market crises on several occasions. Indeed, a fixed
or semi-fixed system works much less well than
freely floating rates. Full currency unification is
surely more efficient and more stable than sepa-
rate currencies with fixed rates. If fixed rates are
truly fixed, there is no reason to have separate
currencies; if fixed rates change from time to time,
the instability damages efficient trade and capital
flows.
I’ve spoken briefly about the floating rate
option because I do not want to leave the impres-
sion that a single unified currency is the best
arrangement for all countries in all conditions.
That is a subject that goes well beyond this panel
discussion, however.
From an economic policy perspective, the
main argument against the creation of the euro
has been that a country might believe that it could
create more stable employment and a more stable
internal price level by employing an independent
monetary policy. Concerning price stability, most
countries in the euro area—the major possible
exception is Germany, of course—believe that
the euro promises more rather than less price
stability. Whether the euro will achieve a price
stability record as impressive as the DM did, only
time will tell. Clearly, though, the institutions of
the ECB have been designed to achieve that end
and it is hard to know what else might be done to
improve the odds on maintaining price stability
over the long run.
The common currency obviously eliminates
certain transactions costs related to exchanging
one currency for another and hedging currency
risks. This sort of microeconomic efficiency is at
the heart of the economic growth process. Reduc-
ing currency risks and price level instabilities
creates favorable conditions for higher economic
growth, but does not by any means guarantee
such growth. It is critical to understand that higher
growth in Europe does not depend on an expan-
sionary monetary policy, but instead on micro-
economic reforms. Europe needs more flexible
labor markets, a more entrepreneurial business
environment, a reduced burden of government
regulations, and a more efficient system of taxes
and subsidies to create improved incentives for
growth.
The United States, although in better shape
on many of the microeconomic dimensions than
Europe, needs exactly the same reforms to increase
its growth rate. There are so many opportunities
in the United States and in Europe for improving
efficiency that I do not know where to start such
a list.
In closing, I want to emphasize a point that
I include in almost every presentation I make.
The primary responsibility of a central bank is to
maintain low and stable inflation, or price stabil-
ity if you prefer that formulation of the same idea.
That is the way a central bank can contribute to
achieving maximum sustainable economic
growth. In the Eighth Federal Reserve District—
the St. Louis District—I have explained to agri-
cultural audiences that creating more money
cannot solve the problems created by inadequate
rainfall, or by the fact that agricultural commodity
prices have been trending down for 150 years
relative to other prices because farm productivity
continues to outpace the increase in the demand
for food. I have explained to other audiences that
printing more money, or less, will do nothing to
solve the electricity demand-supply imbalance
in California. Nor can monetary policy relieve
airport congestion or any of thousands of other
problems that directly impact economic growth.
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2Of these examples, my favorite is that printing
money can’t increase rainfall, because the exam-
ple is so obvious. Monetary policy is simply not
a substitute for addressing environmental and
other disputes that must be resolved through
political means if, to continue the example, we
are to build more dams to provide irrigation
water. All too often, people seem to believe that
monetary policy is an easy way out to create
growth, when it simply isn’t because monetary
policy cannot, as I like to say, make the rain fall.
As I travel around my district I emphasize
that economic development depends on micro-
economic policies that are substantially under
the control of local authorities and local business
leaders. Although not obvious to most European
observers, the United States has major regional
differences in unemployment rates and growth
rates. Within the Eighth Federal Reserve District,
for example, some markets enjoy an unemploy-
ment rate in the 2 to 3 percent range while others
have an unemployment rate in the 8 to 10 percent
range. These unemployment rate differences are
persistent, but they can be addressed by suitable
government policies that promote economic
growth. Good monetary policy contributes enor-
mously to economic growth by creating price
stability, but cannot be expected to create the
microeconomic efficiencies that are at the heart
of the growth process.
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